THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

News from the Front!

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IN THIS ISSUE!

CTC ARCHIVES BOX SCORES, GAME RELAYS, REPLAYS...

by Rick Bogdan, Manuever Analyst

Each football season, coaches, from the high school level to professionals prepping for the Super Bowl, spend hours pouring over game films as an integral part of game plan preparation. ***Wouldn't it be great if Army commanders prepping for combat at the NTC had access to "game films" from offensive and defensive missions already executed at that CTC?*** Imagine how effective it would be in helping prepare battle staffs and subordinate and supporting commanders for the rigors of this desert combat.

Well sports fans, ***that capability exists now,*** and TRADOC school/centers can remotely access this capability for use as a teaching tool.

Where does this capability exist? At the Combat Training Center (CTC) archive, run by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and housed at the Army Research Institute, Presidio of Monterey, CA (ARI-POM).

The word "archive" conjures up images of hundreds of books and documents gathering dust on shelves until sporadically disturbed by rumpled-looking historians conducting some obscure research.

If that's what you picture when you think about the CTC archive, it's time to paint yourself a new picture!

The CTC archive is a dynamic, living, breathing source of invaluable warfighting data and observations.

The archive allows the Army to critically look at tactical-level warfighting performance conducted in a relatively controlled environment against an enemy as formidable as any in the world.

By capturing forever the actions and assessments from hundreds of combat missions, those results can be used to create the long-term equivalent of the after-action review (AAR), while at the same time providing an extremely versatile and useful training tool.

Several elements comprise the total archive data base. Ranging from unit take-home packages, digital firing data from MILES engagements, video tapes of unit AARs, to audio tapes of command radio traffic, the archive database provides analysts with diverse sources to tap.

Technological developments now allow analysts "replay" capability. Thus, when conducting research, the battle results, i.e., the "box score," might point an analyst to some point in the battle where it becomes necessary to "break down the game films" to discover **WHY** results occurred. The collection of data and information available has virtually unlimited application for a variety of users.

The primary audience for using the CTC archive database remains TRADOC schools/centers subject matter experts (SMEs) researching issues.

However, enormous capability exists to support schoolhouse instruction, particularly for officer advance course students. For example, when teaching course-of-action development as part of the command estimate process, instructors can use NTC terrain as the model and place students in a variety of tactical situations mirroring actual NTC missions.

As the students prepare courses of action, the instructor can "call up" a similar mission and the students can see actual results of a similar course of action. The analysis of what actually happened can graphically make the teaching points about the importance of planning and preparation as precursors for execution success or failure. This training can then be reinforced through the use of SIMNET training, where platoon, company, battalion sets of tank, infantry fighting vehicle, and attack helicopter simulators provide extremely realistic maneuver training over the same terrain.

This same teaching methodology has direct application to field units as well. As part of an Officer Professional Development program, commanders could effectively use CTC battle results, replayed, to help train their commanders and staffs. Here again, the analogy of studying "game films" holds true. Short of literally being on the ground for a mission, the capability to "see" NTC missions executed, while being able to study the orders and graphics produced during planning and preparation stages, provides one of the most effective training tools imaginable.

Right now, today, the capability exists for TRADOC schools/centers to remotely access and use the CTC archive resource. The only overhead needed to make this happen is the requirement to have a person on board already "certified" by CALL to utilize the database. CALL conducts quarterly CTC database certification workshops at ARI-POM so that users understand what is in the numerous databases and how to best take advantage of the resources. Once certified, that individual can certify others locally for database/archive access.

For example, the "game films" referred to above are sanitized so they do not reflect unit designations or rotational specifics. This nonattribution policy is necessary to avoid unit comparisons, or component comparisons. Thus, if you wanted examples of "heavy" rotation offensive operations, the order of battle and task organization would reflect what you are looking for, **BUT** you would not know the actual units involved. For field units, CALL and ARI can tailor "case studies." These would be prepackaged, sanitized examples of a variety of missions, with the supporting materials, i.e., OPORDs, graphics, and even audio tapes for use as teaching tools.

For specific information on how to access the CTC archive, contact either
LTC Bill Rue or
MAJ Ken Vanderpool, at
CALL, DSN 551-2255/4317.

DIRECTOR'S OBSERVATIONS

by COL Roger Spickelmier, Dir, CALL

Even casual football fans annually get caught up in the hype and hoopla associated with the Super Bowl. Every nuance imaginable about the respective teams, their coaches, players, front offices, etc., gets analyzed and dissected by armchair quarterbacks in an attempt to determine ahead of time the eventual winner and the techniques and procedures used to produce such a victory.

It appears more than coincidental that the most thoroughly prepared teams, armed with the best personnel and equipment and the best game plans are the teams that consistently find themselves reaching the big game.

If you can accept the idea that deployments to the CTCs for "combat" represent your respective Super Bowls of training, then maybe there are some lessons derived from how successful teams prepare for their big game and how we can prepare ourselves and our units for our training Super Bowls. CALL has capabilities to assist you in your preparation for combat that rival the assets used by big-time football coaches.

In this issue of *NEWS FROM THE FRONT*, the cover story talks about how to utilize the CTC archive, and the article's analogy about studying "game films" truly is appropriate. We're trying to publicize this capability so that more schools/centers tap into this asset, both as a teaching tool and as a means of identifying battlefield issues and solutions.

Solving issues is what the lessons learned business is ultimately about. Philosophically, there is no lesson learned until there's changed behavior. When the behavior changes appropriately, then the lesson is "learned." This all sounds a great deal easier than it is.

Which leads to another piece which will be highlighted next month - the *TRADOC Remedial Action Program, or T-RAP*.

The use of the archive, in conjunction with the systematic, long-term approach to solution implementation and issue resolution, will go a long way in making the entire lessons learned process necessarily more efficient and effective. Diminishing resources simply demand that issue identification and solution implementation be prioritized, with an acknowledgement that the U. S. Army's margin for error grows slimmer daily.

While there's no crush of reporters and media hype when you get your unit to the CTC, there are, instead, the always present OCs. Use of our "game films" will ensure your level of preparation for the training Super Bowl rivals that used by NFL "commanders."

COL ROGER K. SPICKELMIER,
Dir, CALL

MOUT TARGETING: DESIGNATION AND DELIVERY

by MAJ John G. Crary, Chief, Collection Division

MOGADISHU -------- Operations in Somalia are providing a rich source of lessons on Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), particularly in direct and indirect fire target designation.

The decide-detect-deliver targeting methodology serves as an excellent model in a MOUT environment. However, special considerations must be given to the delivery part of the equation.

Two primary considerations face U.S. forces in Mogadishu MOUT operations: proximity of friendly forces and minimizing of collateral damage to civilians.

The challenges of MOUT, the characteristics of operations and the very close proximity of friendly troops to the target demand "precision" in the delivery of fire support munitions.

"Precision targeting" is the phrase used when discussing delivery of any fire support within Mogadishu. Here is a synopsis of techniques successfully validated in this MOUT environment:

PRECISION TARGETING: DIRECT FIRE

- The OH-58D scout helicopter is proving itself invaluable in the precision targeting process. With its lasing capability, the OH-58D allows the ground commander the flexibility to employ a wide variety of munitions with surgical precision.
- Because the standard artillery fire mission using high explosive ordnance and bracketing is not the delivery technique of choice because of inherent range probable errors, ground commanders rely on laser-guided munitions or direct fire weapons.
- The AC-130's 105mm, 40mm, and 20mm cannons and the AH-1F fired TOW are the weapons that minimize danger to friendly troops and collateral damage to civilians. NOTE: Since all street wires are down, the TOW employment is viable. Hellfire missiles are the munition of choice in most circumstances. The AH-1F (Cobra) in theater does not fire the Hellfire.

PRECISION TARGETING: TARGET HANDOVER

- The OH-58D "spots" targets for fighter aircraft, then "hands over" the target to the fighter pilot with great success.
- Target identification for fighter aircraft (A-6 and F-18) in the MOUT environment is extremely difficult:

    *most missions are flown at night.
    *10,000 feet is the minimum altitude because of uncertain SAM threat.
    * inertial navigation systems on fighter aircraft, initialized at departure, can be off by as much as 1 ½ miles at target area, too much error for good target identification.
    *pilot ROE: no drop without positive target identification

.

- OH-58D pilots use GPS and Doppler radar to navigate. Allows pilots 10-digit coordinate accuracy any time during the mission. The system allows them to fly directly to the target in all weather and visibility conditions.
- Army pilots' familiarity with the Mogadishu area is far greater than the Navy and Marine fighter pilots.
- Working directly with the fighter pilots (both A-6 and F-18s are equipped with Laser Spotter Tracker (LST)), the OH58D pilots lase the target. The LST then locks on the reflected energy. The fighter aircraft now has positive identification miles out from the target.
- Dependent on the threat, the fighter pilot can decide to engage directly or launch his ordnance and let the OH-58D laser guide the munition to the target.
- U.S Air Force AC-130H aircraft have already successfully used this same technique of target identification and target handover numerous times.

These fixed-wing engagements for Mogadishu have been planned for contingency operations only and have not been executed. Nonetheless, training with three separate carrier task forces has validated the techniques for successful execution.

The OH-58D provides the ground commander with "laser eyes" over Mogadishu that affords the luxury of precision targeting. This protects our troops and minimizes collateral damage, both essential to overall mission success.

PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS FOR THE CHAPLAIN

by CPT Bob Burns Combat Manuever Analyst

Operations Other than War provide new challenges for more than just the Army's maneuver and support personnel. U. S. Army chaplains find themselves thrust into unfamiliar situations with a learning curve as steep as that for soldiers and commanders in the same theater.

Operation ABLE SENTRY, a UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, where elements from the Berlin Brigade are currently serving, provides some insight into the positive impact of chaplains in this environment.

In this part of the world, diverse religions clearly play a significant role in the daily lives of the population. Religion captures the spotlight in the national political arena as well. The influence of religious figures is significant.

In Macedonia, for example, 60 percent of the population is Greek Orthodox, 25 percent are Muslim, and 2 percent are Roman Catholic. The remainder of the population is splintered amongst a variety of religions and sects.

A Task Force chaplain's interaction with the Macedonian Roman Catholic bishop, and local Greek Orthodox priests proved significant in convincing the religious leaders to positively view the UN mission.

The calming effect resulting from "telling the UN/U.S. story" proved significant in enhancing both force protection (citizens now view the UN positively) and the overall peacekeeping mission.

The friendly relationship resulted in the Macedonian Catholic bishop learning to say Mass in English. He then conducted Mass biweekly for American troops.

The U. S. Army chaplain, in turn, taught English at a local orphanage, operated by Mother Teresa’s order, the Missionaries of Charity.

Coupled with helpful contact with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private organizations (PVOs) operating in theater, the overall efforts demonstrate how effectively Chaplains can serve as peacekeeping multipliers.

Operation BRIGHT STAR 94

by CPT Jay Stefaney, Combat Maneuver Analyst

A recently completed Operation **BRIGHT STAR 94** provides lessons typical of combined exercises. Encompassing deployment to Egypt, maneuver training and redeployment back to the United States, this joint/combined training exercise presented tremendous training opportunities. The observations and issues resulting from the exercise, as spelled out in various after-action reports (AARs), highlight the continuing challenges in bettering interoperability with our allies.

Combined operations, both Operations Other than War (OOTW) and conventional combat, will be the norm in the future. It is important to institutionalize as many lessons as possible from exercises of this importance. Operation BRIGHT STAR 94 proved very successful for all participants. The bulletized issues listed provide a glimpse at the successes to be sustained and the problems to be solved for future exercises.

TRAINING

***** The Egyptian's approach to training exercises differs radically from U.S. training doctrine.

***** The Egyptians invite many foreign visitors and make elaborate VIP preparations, including full chairs, carpets, tents, often with lunch included.

***** The training events for the Egyptians are scripted demonstrations with set times for maneuver, close air support, etc. The U.S. expected a "free play" maneuver exercise. The disconnect between U.S. expectations and reality driven by Egyptian requirements detracted from the achievement of initial U.S. training objectives.

***** Grid coordinates for the four corners of the maneuver box did not correspond with the graphic overlay provided by the J2 to maneuver units. This resulted from discrepancies not noticed during initial coalition coordination.

***** Map overlays were prepared on 1:100,000 map sheets, but units were not issued those scale maps. Attempts to transfer graphics to 1:50,000 and 1:250,000 scale maps created a great deal of confusion.

***** Exercise coordination must resolve map issues so sufficient quantities of the correct scale maps are available to all who need them.

***** Despite the "glitches" associated with some aspects of the exercise, the experience should prove valuable, particularly if future participants in coalition exercises or real-world contingencies learn from the lessons provided by Operation **BRIGHT STAR 94.**

ORGANIZATION

***** The Egyptians did not have the authority to establish a Joint Task Force with Egyptian forces below the Chief of Services. The Egyptian Task Force Commander had no authority or coordination capability to employ Egyptian Air, Special Forces, or Naval Forces.

***** The U.S. JTF commander had to conduct individual coordination with each Egyptian component commanders. This organizational difference resulted in much more time and effort to coordinate combined operations than originally anticipated.

***** Future JTF commanders must recognize, understand, and anticipate these types of cultural/military differences when planning for combined operations.

***** C3IC (Coalition, Coordination, Communication and Integration Center): U.S. must man C3IC with sufficient interpreters and U.S. officers of equal rank to coalition partner if we expect to effectively coordinate and pass information.

EXAMPLE: *Arab forces always put in a general officer as their chief of C3IC, and U.S. forces did not initially have a counterpart.*

A Reminder!

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN 552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.

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